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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. WOODCOCK, : 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
VS- : 
JOHN CRANDALL, : CASE NO. 92-0570 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. : 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the judgment of the trial Court should, be 
overturned when it granted summary judgment? The standard of 
review for this issue is whether after reviewing all of the 
pleadings, depositions, and sworn affidavits and viewing the same 
in a light most favorable to Appellant there exist any dispute of 
a material fact which would preclude summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in allowing a 
proceeding on a motion for summary judgment in violation of Rule 4-
1 
506 of the Rules of Judicial Administration? The standard of 
review is whether the trial court properly followed Rule 4-506. 
3. Whether the trial court committed error in allowing a 
proceeding on a motion for summary judgment in violation of Rule 4-
504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration? The standard of 
review is whether the trial court properly followed Rule 4-504. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(2): 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgment, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-506(3) : 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing 
counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of 
his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in 
person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed 
^with the court and no further proceedings shall be held in the 
matter until 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c): 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
Utah Code Section 78-36-10(2) and (3): 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without 
a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the 
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's 
tenancy, if was is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as 
provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
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rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed under 
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c) , and for reasonable attorney's 
fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
Utah Code Section 78-27-56(1) 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
I. Statement of the Case. 
1. The Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 6, 1992 for 
breach of lease and unlawful detainer. (R.000001) 
2. The Defendant filed an answer on September 16, 1992 
denying the existence of a lease and denying that he was unlawfully 
detaining the property. (R.000017) 
3. On October 23, 1992, counsel for Defendant filed a notice 
of withdrawal. (R.000089) 
4. A telephonic scheduling conference was held between 
counsel for both parties and the court on October 26, 1992. 
(R.000058 and R.000080) 
5- On October 27, 1992, counsel for Plaintiff filed a notice 
to appear in person or obtain new counsel. (R.000091) 
6. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the 
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Court on November 10, 1992. (R.000135) 
7. The motion for summary judgment was granted on November 
23, 1992. (R.000264) 
II. Statement of the Facts 
1. In 1985 Appellant obtained an option to purchase certain 
property located at 558 Main Street, Park City, Utah, from a third 
party unrelated to this appeal. He intended to use the building to 
house a retail clothing business which he owned and operated. (See 
Deposition of John Crandall, Page 22, Lines 1-23, See Affidavit of 
John Crandall, R.000261) . 
2. Appellant was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding under 
a chapter eleven reorganization in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court. He desired to exercise the option on the property in Park 
City but was hampered in his ability to do so because of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. He approached Appellee with a proposal that 
he function as a straw man to assist him by holding title to the 
property and participating in obtaining needed financing to 
exercise the option. (See Deposition of John Crandall, Page 29, 
Line 5-20; Page 34, Lines 13-25. See Deposition of David Woodcock, 
Page 16, Lines 9-25). 
3. Appellee agreed to participate with Appellant in the 
exercising of the option. Appellant paid approximately $40,000 
toward the exercise of the option plus some closing costs. 
Appellee paid approximately $10,000 plus some closing costs which 
Appellee argues were partially if not totally paid back. The 
property was vested in the name of the Appellee and he applied for 
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and received permanent financing on the property with the 
assistance of the Appellant. (See Deposition of John Crandall, 
Page 23, Lines 10-24. See Affidavit of John Crandall, R.000261. 
See Deposition of David Woodcock, Page 22, Lines 1-18, and Page 23, 
Lines 1-16). 
4. The Appellant was always in possession of the property at 
all times relevant to this action. (See Plaintiff's Complaint, 
R.000004, Paragraph 16). 
5- Both parties agree that verbal agreements were entered 
into, both prior to and after the time that the Appellee took title 
to the property and signed to obtain the financing, to allow the 
Appellant to compensate Appellee for his efforts and to thereafter 
buy out the Appellee. The parties dispute the terms of the verbal 
agreements and in particular, whether the verbal agreements were 
terminated at any point in time and also whether the occupancy of 
the Appellant then became a month to month tenancy. (See 
Deposition of David Woodcock, Page 24, Line 14-25, Page 25, Line 1-
35. See Affidavit of John Crandall, R.000261). 
6. Appellant remained in possession and made payments to 
Appellee equivalent to the payments due under the financing. 
Appellee made repairs and improvements to the building and paid 
some taxes on the property. The parties agree that over the years 
they made several efforts to obtain refinancing of the building in 
an effort to allow Appellant to buy out the Appellee's interest, 
all of which failed. (See Deposition of David Woodcock, Page 48, 
Lines 5-24) . 
6 
7. In April 1991 an agreement was reached that $3,000 per 
month would be paid by Appellant to Appellee. Appellee argues that 
the agreement was a rental agreement. Appellant argues that the 
parties agree to compensate Appellee approximately $500 per month 
(over and above the cost of servicing the debt which was 
approximately $2,500 per month) for the extra time it was taking to 
obtain the needed refinancing to buy out his interest. (See 
Deposition of David Woodcock, Page 60, Line 16-25; Page 61, Lines 
1-8. See Affidavit of John Crandall, R.000261). 
8. On July 17, 1992 Appellee served a notice to pay rent and 
property taxes or to vacate and subsequently brought an action 
under the unlawful detainer statute. (See Complaint, Paragraph 14, 
R.000004) . 
9. A motion for summary judgment was filed and ruled on 
following a hearing on the 23rd day of November, 1992. Judge Frank 
G. Noel granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment and ordered 
restitution of the premises to the Appellee and awarded judgment 
for $5,435.48 in past due rent, $23,965.84 in back taxes owing on 
the property, and treble damages for unlawful detainer in the 
amount of $54,408.72. (See R.000264 and R.000289). 
10. The judgment was signed and entered on the same day 
without Appellant being served a copy and being provided an 
opportunity to object to the wording or the appropriateness of the 
judgment as entered. No copy of the judgment was ever mailed to 
the Appellant. (See R.000284-291). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law 
when it granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment because 
there exists genuine issues of material fact which remain in 
dispute and preclude resolution of this case on summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Appellant established the existence of genuine issues of material 
facts in his answer, his sworn deposition, and his affidavit in 
opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is therefore inappropriate. 
The Appellee failed to comply with the Rules of Judicial 
Administration and judgment should be vacated until such time as 
the party complies with the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Appellee violated Rule 4-504(2) by failing to submit the judgment 
to the Appellant as a pro se litigant prior to submitting the 
judgment to the Court. Appellee violated Rule 4-506(3) by failing 
to wait for the statutory time limit to expire after filing a 
notice of withdrawal and prior to taking any further action in the 
proceeding. Due to Appellee's failure to comply with the Rules of 
Judicial Administration, judgment should be vacated and reversed as 
a matter of law. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Appellee 
an award for unpaid property taxes, pursuant to Section 78-36-10(2) 
and (3) , Utah Code Annotated. The trial court erred by permitting 
the Appellee to submit a judgment which included unpaid taxes as 
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part of the judgment. Therefore, this Court should remit the 
judgment and excise any award of taxes contained therein. 
The trial court erred in signing a judgment which provided for 
an award of attorney's fees, pursuant to Section 78-36-10, Utah 
Code Annotated. This section permits the collection of attorney's 
fees only if the contract between the parties permits the 
collection of attorney's fees. In the present case, there is no 
written contract between the parties. Further, pursuant to Section 
78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, the trial court is permitted to 
award attorney's fees if the court determines that the "action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith". Appellee brought this action, and Appellant 
defended the action in good faith. Therefore, an award of 
attorney's fees in this matter is inappropriate. 
The trial court erred in granting judgment for an amount not 
supported by the evidence. The trial court granted Appellee 
damages based upon reasonable value of rent rather than the actual 
monthly amount which Appellant had been paying at the time of the 
alleged unlawful detainer. All evidence presented in this matter 
regarded the actual monthly amount which Appellant had been paying. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT WHICH REMAIN IN DISPUTE. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because there exist genuine 
issues of material fact which remain in dispute and preclude 
resolution of this case on Summary Judgment. Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, states, 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Because Summary Judgment is granted as a matter of law, this 
court should give no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Hodgson v. Bunzl, 844 P. 2d 331 (Utah 1991) . See also 
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp. , 813 P. 2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) . Moreover, 
this court should regard the facts and inferences in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Hodgson at 332, citing Rose v. 
Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah 1986). 
In this action, the Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 6, 
1992 asserting claims of breach of lease and unlawful detainer. 
Under this complaint the Plaintiff alleged that he was the fee 
owner of a parcel of land located at 558 Main Street in Park City. 
The Defendant responded to the complaint by filing his answer on 
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September 16, 1992. In his answer, the Defendant denied the 
existence of a lease and denied that he was unlawfully detaining 
the property. Further, the Defendant asserted that he was the 
rightful owner of the property in dispute and was rightfully in 
possession pursuant to an executory oral purchase contract with the 
Plaintiff that had been partially performed. 
The Defendant established the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact in his answer, his sworn deposition and then he filed 
his affidavit in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
trial court must consider all of the pleadings in determining the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Where the 
Defendant's pleadings and affidavit establish such an issue Summary 
Judgment is inappropriate. 
In his testimony given in his deposition Defendant asserted 
that he had been engaged in the process of purchasing the building 
in question since 1984. See Crandall Deposition, Sept. 28, 1992, 
p. 17, lines 1-6. Defendant asserted that an agreement between the 
parties existed whereby Defendant would purchase the building in 
Plaintiff's name as his nominee. See Crandall Deposition, Sept. 
28, 1992, p. 34, lines 5-25. The agreement provided that Plaintiff 
would obtain the financing in his name and the Defendant would make 
the payments, do all repairs and cover all other costs incidental 
to the ownership of the building. At such time as he was 
financially able Defendant would then refinance the building 
whereupon the building would be conveyed into his name. See 
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Crandall Deposition, Sept. 28, 1992, p. 58, lines 8-14. This 
agreement was again reaffirmed in Defendant's Affidavit in 
opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. These 
allegations contained in sworn deposition and affidavit create a 
genuine question as to the existence of an executory verbal 
contract for purchase between the parties. The existence of this 
issue casts doubt over and raises a dispute over the existence of 
the lease agreement alleged by the Plaintiff. These disputed facts 
attack the very heart of Plaintiff's cause of action and preclude 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendant denied the existence of a lease in his Answer. 
Defendant denied the existence of a lease in his deposition. See 
Crandall Deposition, October 30, 1992, p. 15, lines 19-24 and p. 
37, line 6. Defendant also denied the existence of a lease in his 
affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
In an action for unlawful detainer it is error for the trial court 
to allow one party to prevail on a motion for summary judgment 
where the very existence of the lease itself is so clearly in 
dispute. 
In his affidavit, Defendant asserted that in the spring of 
1985 he made a down payment on the building in dispute. See 
Crandall Affidavit, §2. Defendant further stated that he and the 
Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement whereby the Plaintiff 
would obtain financing in his own name to exercise a purchase 
option which belonged to the Defendant whereupon the property would 
be deeded to the Plaintiff but occupied by the Defendant until he 
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could get his own financing. See Crandall Affidavit §3. Defendant 
stated that the parties7 agreement contemplated a transfer of the 
building back into Defendant's name at some later unspecified date. 
See Crandall Affidavit, §5. Defendant was to make the mortgage 
payments and maintain the property generally until he could obtain 
his financing and payoff the Plaintiff's loan. Defendant denies 
that these payments were to be construed as rent. Defendant 
specifically denies the existence of a lease between the parties. 
See Crandall Affidavit, §9. Finally, Defendant states that the 
oral agreement between the parties provided that Defendant would be 
required to pay all taxes upon the date of transfer of the property 
into Defendant's name. See Crandall Affidavit, §12. Thus, under 
the affidavit in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendant established the existence of several genuine 
issues of material fact the existence of which, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the Defendant, makes Summary Judgement 
inappropriate. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Reviewing the pleadings, 
depositions and affidavits in a light most favorable to the 
Defendant, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, it is 
clear that there exists several genuine issue of material fact. 
Because there exists a genuine issue of material fact, the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
II. A PARTY MUST COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF JDDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION AND WHERE A PARTY FAILS TO DO SO THE 
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JUDGMENT AWARDED SHOULD BE VACATED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE 
PARTY COMPLIES WITH THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Specifically, the Plaintiff violated both Rule 4-
504(c) and Rule 4-506 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Because the Plaintiff violated the Rules of Judicial 
Administration, this court should vacate the trial court's judgment 
until such time as the Plaintiff complies with the Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
A. Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Plaintiff violated Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Rule 4-504(2) states 
Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
In the present case, Plaintiff violated Rule 4-504(2) by 
failing to submit the judgment to the Defendant as a pro se 
litigant prior to submitting the judgment to the court. By so 
doing, the Defendant was precluded from commenting on or objecting 
to the content of the judgment prior to it being signed by the 
trial judge. Plaintiff's failure to do so has prejudiced the 
Defendant in that in incorrect and unjust judgment was entered 
against him, he was improperly evicted, and has been subjected to 
levy and execution on his assets since the entry. 
The trial court abused its discretion in signing the judgment 
where Plaintiff failed to first submit the judgment to Defendant 
and the Judgement should be vacated so as to preclude manifest 
injustice. In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah 
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1953) , a quiet title action, the court said, "The allowance of a 
vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may occur through 
procedural difficulties, the wrongs of opposing party, or 
misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense." 
Warren at 419. Thus, this court may exercise its equitable powers 
to vacate the trial court's judgment where a result is harsh based 
on the conduct of the opposing party. 
Plaintiff's attorney overstepped the bounds of propriety in 
submitting to the judge the order which he did and the court abused 
its discretion in signing an order which did not comply with the 
rules. Defendant was not allowed an opportunity to comment or 
object to the contents of the proposed order which is a direct 
violation of Rule 4-504. Consequently, this court should vacate 
the trial court's judgment under its equitable powers because of 
the trial court's abuse of it's discretion in signing an order that 
was not in compliance with the Rules. 
B. Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
This court should vacate the trial court's grant of Summary 
judgment as entirely inappropriate because the Plaintiff violated 
Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Rule 4-506(3) 
states, 
"(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, 
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented 
client of his responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further 
proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice 
shall be filed with the court and no further proceedings shall 
be held in the matter until 20 days have elapsed from the date 
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of filing."(emphasis added). 
The rule contains a mandatory proscription against any further 
proceedings in an action until twenty days have elapsed following 
the date of filing the notice to obtain counsel or appear. 
Defendant was originally represented by counsel. On October 
26, 1992, a telephonic scheduling conference was held between 
counsel for both parties and the court. At that time counsel for 
Defendant made an oral motion to withdraw. The court conditionally 
granted Defendant's Counsel's Motion to Withdraw by requiring him 
to remain as counsel of record until following the completion of 
Defendant's deposition on October 27, 1992 and thereafter serving 
an appropriate notice pursuant to Rule 4-506. At such time as 
these things had been done, Counsel for Defendant was permitted to 
withdraw. On October 23, 1992, counsel for Defendant filed his 
notice of Withdrawal and Counsel for the Plaintiff signed a mailing 
certificate stating that he had mailed a copy of a Notice to Appear 
in Person or Obtain Counsel to Defendant. Under Rule 4-506, after 
making allowance for mailing time as required under Rule 6(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no further proceedings were 
permissible in this case until after the expiration of twenty three 
(23) days from October 23, 1992. No further action could be taken 
in the Case until after November 15, 1992. 
Plaintiff violated Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration because he did not wait for twenty three days before 
taking any action. On November 10, 1992, eighteen days after 
serving by mail the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel Plaintiff 
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filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with the court. This act in 
itself is a violation of Rule 4-506. 
Defendant was prejudiced by the court allowing the Motion to 
proceed notwithstanding that the Motion was brought in violation of 
Rule 4-506. Defendant was unrepresented and was not able to 
prepare adequately to meet the arguments of Plaintiff's Motion by 
reason of the violation of Rule 4-506. 
In Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984), this court 
reviewed the question of whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in granting a party's Motion for Summary Judgment when 
the moving party failed to comply with the predecessor to Rule 4-
506. In Sperry, this court said, 
"Since the judgment was entered after the failure of the court 
to follow one of its own rules, we conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion" 
Sperry at 582. The present case is very much like Sperry. While 
the attorney in Sperry did not comply with the predecessor to Rule 
4-506 at all (no Notice to Appear in Person or Obtain Counsel was 
mailed to the other party), in the present case Plaintiff's failure 
to wait the required time before initiating further proceedings is 
no less a failure to comply and does not make the result any less 
prejudicial. Defendant was precluded from effectively responding 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant appeared and 
represented himself pro se at the hearing with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. His prior attorney had earlier that 
same day attempted to obtain a continuance and had explained that 
he had undertaken to find other counsel for the Defendant and had 
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not done so and to proceed against the Defendant would be unfair. 
The request was denied. No record of the proceeding was made. 
Compliance with the Rule 4-506 is mandatory and Plaintiff's 
violation of that rule which was not enforced by the trial Court is 
a clear abuse of discretion and constitutes adequate grounds to 
reverse and vacate the trial court's judgment as a matter of law. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FIXING THE 
DAMAGES WHICH WERE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PROPERTY TAXES. 
Assuming arguendo, that the parties had entered into a month 
to month tenancy, the trial court erred as a matter or law in 
granting Plaintiff an award for unpaid property taxes. Section 
§78-36-10 Utah Code (1992), in the relevant part, states 
" (2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the Defendant's default, shall also 
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the 
following: 
(a) . . . 
(b) . . . unlawful detainer; 
(c) . . . 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) . . . 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
the rent, for three times the amount of damages assessed under 
Subsection 2(a) through (c) and for reasonable attorney's 
fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
The trial court granted the Plaintiff a judgment in the amount 
of $18,650.60 for unpaid property taxes even though there was 
clearly no written lease which provided for the payment of property 
taxes and there was a dispute as to whether there was any oral 
lease. Moreover, Defendant's affidavit disputed any liability for 
property taxes as a condition of occupancy of the premises. The 
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parties did not have a written lease agreement. Defendant was in 
possession of the property and alleged that he was making payments 
to Plaintiff pursuant to a verbal agreement to purchase the 
property. There was no written agreement under which the Defendant 
had agreed to pay the property taxes as rent. Further, Defendant 
states that the only agreement between the parties which dealt with 
taxes was that Defendant would pay all taxes upon the date of 
transfer of the property into his name. See Crandall Affidavit, 
§12. 
Further, even though the proposed property tax for 1992 was 
$3,381.13 as set forth in Plaintiff's own Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the court awarded the Plaintiff an award for property tax 
in the amount of $5,315.24 in the judgment. This amount is clearly 
an action for unlawful detainer, the damages generally include the 
reasonable value of rent of the premises. In Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1322 (1976) this 
court stated that the damages under an action for unlawful detainer 
"are generally the reasonable rental value of the premises." 
Pinaree at 1322 citing 32 A.L.R.2d 582 "Measure of Damages for 
Tenant's Failure to Surrender Possession of Rented Premises," Sec. 
4, p. 589. See also Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 
560 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1977) and Monroe v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 
1025 (Utah App. 1989). Thus, the appropriate measure of damages 
under §78-36-10 is reasonable rental value. The trial court 
misinterpreted §78-36-10 by permitting the Plaintiff to submit a 
judgment which included unpaid taxes as part of the judgment. This 
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court should remit the judgment and excise any award of taxes 
contained therein. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING A JUDGMENT WHICH 
PROVIDED FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The trial court misinterpreted §78-36-10 by permitting 
Plaintiff to gain an award for attorney's fees. Section 78-36-10 
permits the collection of attorney's fees only if the contract 
between the parties permits the collection of attorney's fees. In 
the present case, there is no written contract between the parties. 
Clearly the Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees under §78-
36-10, U.C.A. (1992). 
Plaintiff is also not entitled to attorney's fees under §78-
27-56, U.C.A. (1992) . Under §78-27-56 the trial court is permitted 
to award attorney's fees in a civil action if the court determines 
that the "action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith." §78-27-56(1), U.C.A. (1992). 
In the present case, the Plaintiff brought the action. The 
Defendant defended the action by denying the allegations and 
asserting in good faith that he was a purchaser of the property 
under an oral contract. No trial of these disputed facts was ever 
granted or held. Moreover the Plaintiff did not seek attorney's 
fees under §78-27-56 in either his complaint or his Motion for 
Summary Judgment. However, when Plaintiff submitted the judgment 
to the court without first permitting the Defendant the opportunity 
to review the proposed judgment under Rule 4-504 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, it contained an award of attorney's fees 
20 
awarded pursuant to rule Section 78-27-56. Defendant maintains 
that the trial Court did not make a finding with respect to 
attorney fees at the hearing on the Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, nor did Plaintiff provide an affidavit to the Defendant 
setting forth the amount of fees claimed and the basis for the 
claim of fees which he could then review and appropriately 
challenge. Therefore, this court should remit the trial courts 
grant of Summary Judgment and thereby excise any award of 
attorney's fees contained therein. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR AN AMOUNT 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE. 
The trial court erred when it granted Plaintiff damages based 
upon reasonable value of rent rather than the actual monthly amount 
which Defendant had been paying at the time of the alleged unlawful 
detainer. The evidence clearly showed that the Defendant had been 
paying and the Plaintiff accepting the sum of Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3000.00) per month for at least one year prior to filing 
the complaint. However, the judgment based the reasonable value 
of the rental at a per diem cost of $146.26. Based on a thirty 
(30) day average month, this $146.26 per diem cost increases the 
monthly amount from $3,000.00 per month to $4,387.80 per month. 
The amount awarded ignores all sworn statements by both parties as 
to what their conduct had been between them even though the 
complaint in the first place alleged an arrearage on a lease 
agreement which was founded on $3000.00 per month. Defendant 
alleges that this amount placed in the judgment was not found by 
21 
the court and is simply a figure placed in the order by the 
Plaintiff's Counsel. If this Court does not overturn the summary 
judgment entirely then it should at least remit the trial court's 
judgment and reduce the damages to conform to the actual amount 
supported by the uncontroverted testimony in the record which is 
$3000.00 per month. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the legitimate issues of fact in this matter, the 
trial court's ruling in favor of Summary Judgment should be set 
aside. 
DATED and SIGNED this /c/ day of May, 1993 
Stfeven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of 
May, 1993, to the following: 
Robert M. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
10 E. South Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. WOODCOCK, : 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, : ADDENDUM 
VS. : 
JOHN CRANDALL, : CASE NO. 92-0570 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. : PRIORITY 15 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL KES^TRICT ' //-^l<^f'0' 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Ml 4 
DAVID J. WOODCOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN CRANDELL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ((s-'tfJ^lV' 
Civil No. 9211580 
Judge Frank Noel 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing on KS^ kftM the ^ V ^ day of ^ W , 19^V 
before the above entitled court, the Honorable Frank Noel, District 
Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was represented by Robert M. 
Anderson of ANDERSON & WATKINS. Defendant was represented by 
The Court having reviewed the evidence introduced by the 
plaintiff in support of its Motion on file herein and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Defendant is in unlawful detainer of the premises 
located at 558 Main Street, Park City, Utah. 
2. That any and all rights of Defendant in the 558 Main 
Street property pursuant to the rental agreement are hereby 
forfeited. 
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3. That Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $24,086.08 in 
unpaid rent as of July 20# 1992, calculated as follows: 
(a) $500.00 unpaid rent for May 1992; 
(b) $3,000.00 unpaid rent for June 1992; 
(c) $1,935.48 unpaid rent through July 20, 1992; 
(d) $18,650.60 representing property taxes assessed 
against the property through December 31, 1991, 
including penalties and interest thereon. 
4. That Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of in 
damages, representing the reasonable rental value of the property 
from July 20, 1992, to the date judgment is entered, trebled in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-10(3). The reasonable 
rental value of the property is $146.26 per diem. 
5. That Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of in 
damages, representing the pro rata share of 1992 property taxes as 
of the date judgment is entered with amounts accruing after July 
20, 1992 trebled in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-
10(3). The proposed tax on the property for 1992 is $3,381.13 or 
$9.26 per diem. 
6. That Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorneys7 fees, to be determined by the court in accordance with 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56. 
7. That Plaintiff is entitled to immediate restitution of 
the subject property pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-10(1). 
8. That judgment shall be issued and enforced immediately 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-10(4). 
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9. That execution upon the judgment shall be issued 
immediately after the entry of judgment. 
10- That interest shall accrue on the total judgment for rent 
and damages at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment 
until paid. 
i 
DATED this <r< T^ day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
(K:\clients\woo92003\ 1021 sj.jud) 
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